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There is no psychology, there is only biography and auto-biography. 
Thomas Szazs  
 
We have been very interested in Hubert Hermans’ work and it’s a pleasure for us to 
have the opportunity to reflect on his theoretical and methodological proposals. If every 
utterance is an answer to a question, as Bakhtin (1963/1984) argued, the following one 
seems to be central to Hermans and his collaborators: how do we create meaning in our 
lives? In his efforts to answer this question, Hermans has been developing a theoretical 
system, based on the valuation theory and the self-confrontation method (SCM) (see 
Hermans & Hermans-Jensen, 1995), in which the self is conceived as a narrative process.  
But Hermans and Kempen (1993) go beyond this. They not only recognize the 
linguistic basis of self-understanding; they also insist on the relational features of language 
itself. Anchored on Bakhtin’s work, they invite us to appreciate of self-narratives as 
dialogues between different narrative positions. That has created one of the most promising 
ways to develop a dynamic perspective about selfhood. As Valsiner (2000) recently asserts, 
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we need a new vocabulary to surpass the old static conceptions of self, and the “’Nijmegen 
tradition of dialogical self’ [is] the most promising conceptualization system” (p.4). 
Hermans and collaborators (see Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Hermans-Jensen, 1995; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1993) lead us towards the idea of a "spatialized" self, with different 
voices clustered around different I-positions. This process of constructing integration 
through dialogue is one of the most interesting and important characteristics of their work 
and is clearly visible in the present article. Moreover, Hermans also clarifies how personal 
meaning is anchored in social voices. These two aspects of his work — the construction of 
integration through dialogue and the contributions from other characters that are present in 
the social (even imaginary) space of the person — are, in our view, very important for the 
understanding of the self and the transformations of meaning that take place in our lives 
and in psychotherapy. Furthermore, the relationship that is presupposed between 
multiplicity and social influence of the internal voices allows us to overcome the 
conception of a self isolated from the social world, what some scholars have called the self-
contained self (e.g., Sampson, 1993; Stlororow & Atwood, 1992). These aspects influenced 
us very much in our clinical practice, and we look forward with curiosity to the 
developments they will inspire. 
Now Hermans offers us a new challenge: the Personal Position Repertoire (PPR), 
which is a procedure for mapping the dialogical self. We could say that, after the SCM, this 
is also a methodological tool that represents an effort to study the dialogical processes of 
the self. In this article, for the purpose of illustrating this method, Hermans uses several 
clinical and case studies, which make this dialogue between theory and practice clear and 
particularly interesting. 
 
In this commentary, we will try to detach ourselves from our adherence to Hermans’ 
ideas in order to create a counter-voice. As Bakhtin argued, when our vision is 
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supplemented with the vision of others, a “surplus of seeing” occurs, which can bring us a 
more comprehensive perspective (see Holquist, 1990). 
 
The personal organization of the dialogical self 
The PPR is a tool devised to study the organization of the dialogical self. Its 
fundamental advantage is that it allows us to get in touch with the different narrative 
positions available to the person, the repertory of potential voices. 
We suggest that in this method we can find two central and new assumptions of 
Hermans’ work: 
- the narrative positions can be elicited through an articulation between external 
and internal positions; 
- the prominence is a central dimension of dialogical organization. 
 
At first sight, the separation between internal and external positions could appear to 
be a return to the old Cartesian divisions. However, the PPR is constructed in such a way 
that it is not possible to completely dissociate the internal and the external, because they 
function as coordinated pairs. This can be related to one of Bakhtin’s (1979/1986) central 
ideas: the creation of meaning and the creation of self involves a relation between the I and 
the Other, or between a center and a periphery (Holquist, 1990). In a communicative act, 
the speaker always addresses an audience. In this way, every act of self-understanding is a 
relational act by which the person defines his or her position towards others. In practical 
terms, what Hermans is doing can be described as a coordination between self-referential 
terms and different kinds of audiences and contexts. 
The second assumption is related to the “prominence”, which in this method means 
the kind of relation each internal position has with the external positions (“the extent of 
coming forward”). This gives an opportunity to appreciate the audience of a particular 
position, allowing the study of the relationship between different voices. It is possible, for 
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example, to find out that some positions are addressed only to a small audience or, on the 
contrary, that the audience of some particular voice contains a wide rage of characters. 
And, fundamentally, it also creates an opportunity to explore the dialogues that are going 
on around one specific position. 
But what does prominence mean in this context? As Hermans says, the prominence 
score can have different meanings (e.g., a low prominence of an internal position can mean 
that it is not an important position, that it is an important position but restricted to some 
particular contexts, or that is a suppressed position). So, prominence it is not a direct index 
of power or dominance.  
In our view, if the target is the organization of the dialogical self, we also would be 
interested in developing a way of getting in touch with the power of each position. As 
Hermans and Kempen (1993) have recognized, power is related with dialogue. More 
specifically, they have stated that some positions can dominate others, which means that 
that position has a more powerful place than the dominated ones. The results of our 
research suggest that this can have two kinds of outcomes: on the one hand, the dominant 
position may suppress some potential voices and even inhibit the movement to other forms 
of meaning-making; and on the other hand, it can be an organizing and integrating 
tendency, necessary to positioning ourselves in the here-and-now (Salgado & Gonçalves, 
2000). 
We tend to consider power and dominance as especially important dimensions of the 
personal organization of multivocality, as Nancy’s case demonstrates: the most relevant 
position was the “child”, because that voice was dominating her daily life. The same 
phenomenon occurs with many psychotherapy clients: they feel that their lives are 
dominated by specific voices, sometimes even absurd or illogical, but powerful 
nevertheless. Unfortunately, the prominence index does not give us a clear indication of the 
power dimension of dialogical relationships. However, Hermans also shows that this can be 
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compensated with a simple procedure: asking the person to write a diary where a careful 
analysis of the power of each position in daily life is developed. 
 
The process of assessment 
Every method of research and every process of assessment are ways of producing a 
specific reality. PPR is not an exception, which leads us to a careful examination of the 
process of assessment in order to clarify the data. 
In our view, the most problematic implicit assumption of PPR is the cross-situational 
prominence of each voice. For instance, the presence of an internal position (e.g., “I as a 
psychologist”) related to one particular external position (e.g., "my father") could bear 
different meanings, depending on the context (e.g., my work or my family), or even 
depending on the specific interaction in the same context. This is related to an important 
and difficult problem for any methodology devised to assess the dialogical self: from what 
position is the person talking in each moment? Without an answer to this question, it is 
difficult to know what kinds of results we are obtaining. It is difficult to say, because while 
the person is rating the matrix, it is assumed that a dialogical process is still present. But 
what kind of position is the person assuming in that particular moment in time? Is the 
person assuming the internal position under evaluation in the rating process? Or is the 
person assuming a different position from which is appreciating the one under evaluation. 
For instance, it could be that one of us, while evaluating the position “me as psychologist”, 
appreciates his experience as he usually does when he assumes that role. But it is also 
possible that, while rating the same position, one assumes a slightly different position, for 
instance, “me as optimistic”, from which he evaluates what happens in his experience as 
psychologist. 
 
We suspect that a possible hidden assumption is present: that we can assume a meta-
position that evaluates the other ones – a kind of neutral and cross-situational position, from 
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which the person rates the prominence. But, what kind of information does a person have to 
have in mind during this rating? A particular situation, a selective view of how the person 
has been behaving, what the person has been thinking about himself or herself in the last 
week, what the person believes others think about her or him? And aren't all the options 
important and potentially generative of different informative matrices? How can we decide 
to choose between the different possibilities? We think that PPR is an interesting acting 
performance, but maybe we are losing the best part of it: what the person is doing while 
rating the matrix, the dialogues that are going on. It could be like predicting the weather 
using a unique photo of the sky, losing the changes that are continuously occurring. 
Given that we believe that the person answering the PPR needs to arrive at some kind 
of meta-position during the ratings (prominence and affects), reification could be an 
undesirable outcome, leading the person to take the results as the way she or he really is. 
It is true that Hermans (in this issue) alerts us to the fact that, despite the similarity 
between the positions and traditional traits, these are not traits, but we do not see how he 
avoids the subjects transforming their responses into something similar to traits. Hermans 
seems very concerned with avoiding reification and he refers to this several times in the 
article. One important argument he makes is that positions (internal and external) are not 
reflections of the way a person is but they "function as I-positions" (p. 10). But again, how 
can people take this into account when looking at the final results? The theory allows the 
psychologist to avoid reification of the meaning that emerges in the PPR, but how can we 
avoid rigidification of meaning from the participants? If we use PPR as a general method 
we face the risk of suggesting to clients that it gives a true reflection of the person, instead 
of particular constellations of I-positions in an ever-changing self-space. 
Of course, we are not denying that PPR is an interesting exercise to be used in 
psychotherapy, especially if we collect more information regarding the multifacetedness 
and multivocality (Hermans, 1996) of the self. Hermans convincingly shows that PPR can 
be a starting point for a change in the dialogue between the psychologist and the person. It 
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has some additional features that can be further explored. For example, it could be very 
interesting to know what the relevant external voices suggest in relation to several 
problematic issues and how the available internal ones react to these. 
 
Issues about expertise and psychotherapy 
One other problem that concerns us in the SCM and now in the PPR is the differential 
power they may imply between psychologist and client. Hermans insists (and he does this 
in other texts as well, see for instance Hermans and Hermans-Jansen, 1995) that the final 
meaning is negotiated between psychologists and clients: "the participants... [are seen] as 
experts of the meaning they give to events in their own lives... [and] the psychologist is 
seen as an expert in theory" (p.19). It is clear that these procedures are more collaborative 
than the traditional ones used by personality psychologists (e.g., personality 
questionnaires). We wonder, however, about the way the theory shapes the knowledge of 
the participants and even changes the meaning of their experience. One can argue that when 
a person asks for counseling or psychotherapy, in one way or another, they feel the need to 
create some changes in the meaning of their lives. However, if the psychotherapist imposes 
a specific way of interpreting the person, this can have a negative outcome: a “dialogical 
monologization”. In this way, the content will be about dialogue, but the process represents 
a monologic temptation. Therefore, if the problem is not only the modification of meaning, 
but also the empowerment of the client, a question remains for all of us: how to respect the 
expertise of the person?  
In the majority of narrative therapies (see for instance, McNamee & Gergen, 1992; 
Hoyt, 1998), there is a central concern about the issue of power differences between 
psychologist and client, and some suggestions have been made for helping the clinician to 
become more an expert in the process of therapy, than in the product of it (Anderson & 
Levin, 1998). In the specific case of PPR, we wonder if the desired outcomes would not be 
possible in a more negotiated way. For instance, we could try to find different voices and 
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regularities between different positions through a more narrative (e.g., narrative interview, 
reflection with the therapist) and less paradigmatic way (e.g., Pearson's correlation, list of 
pre-given affects, likert scale of the affects). In our view, that would be more empowering 
to the client than to rely in processes (such as the above mentioned) that only the 
psychologist has expertise over.  
An illustration of this problem can be found in this article. Discussing the affective 
connotations of the valuations, Hermans proposes that the collaboration between the 
psychologist and the client is evident, since the client offers the content of the valuations 
and the psychologist helps them to understand its meaning. Accordingly, "affective 
meaning of the valuations is more the product of the methodological expertise of the 
psychologist" (p.20). But how can the position of the participant as an author remain 
central, since, as he writes, "when we know more about the particular connotation 
represented by a particular valuation, we know more about the valuation itself, which also 
implies that the affective meaning of a valuation cannot be separated from it." (p.23). If the 
"particular connotation" is, at least in part, given by the expertise of the psychologist, 
couldn't this limit the ability of the client to generate meaning? Wouldn't it be possible that 
this expertise of the psychologist reduces the ability of the participant to author their own 
lives, given that it's not possible to separate the content of the valuation (resulting from the 
client) and the emotional meaning (resulting from the expertise of the psychologist)? 
Couldn't the last one be imposed on the former? 
Of course, we are not suggesting here that PPR can not be useful in psychotherapy  - 
and certainly it is an invaluable tool for certain types of research. However, we believe that 
our clients will benefit if we try to use processes in which they are experts. In this way, 
instead of attributing the power to the techniques, they can attribute the power to 
themselves and to the therapeutic conversation. 
We will illustrate our position, using Nancy as an example. The main outcome of 
PPR was the identification of a problematic facet: "the child position". Interestingly, this 
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conclusion was not based on the correlation, but in a narrative process: Nancy kept a diary 
and discussed it with the psychotherapist. As the process developed, an interesting reaction 
happened, in which Nancy detached herself from “the child”. The costs of this child-
position became transparent and this opened the door for the emergence of a counter-story. 
The "independent" seemed a very good candidate for organizing this new story of herself. 
This created the possibility for the therapist to work further in contrasting the "old" (Nancy 
dominated by the "child") and the "new" (Nancy giving a voice to the "independent") 
stories1. We ask ourselves if the PPR computations were really so important in arriving at 
this point of the therapeutic process. 
In our clinical practice we have been working with the meaning of different facets of 
the self in relation to a particular problem. This is inspired by the narrative therapy of 
White and Epston (1990), since they emphasize the way in which problems and counter-
stories are socially supported. After the client identifies several facets, we try to anchor 
them historically (in the life of the client) and socially, trying to find what characters in 
their life-stories support or oppose each facet 2. For instance, we would be interested in 
knowing how a specific facet makes sense in a particular relationship, or the way that facet 
is silenced in another relationship. In this process of anchoring the facets we also try to 
detail specific episodes in which each facet is present or activated. This is a way we 
frequently use, to deal with the multiplicity (of facets or positions) and to relate these to the 
social influences that shape them. From a standpoint like this, which we believe is 
congruent with Hermans' theory on the dialogical self, an almost infinite number of 
questions can be posed to understand more about the meaning of each position.  
We do not completely agree with the claim from Szazs that we quoted in the 
beginning of this commentary, but we feel that, psychology has been creating devices to 
                                                 
1Curiously enough this account of the process reminds us the way narrative therapist operates (see White & 
Epston, 1990). 
2 Of course, opposition and support are not the only relationships that can be meaningful to the client. 
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evaluate, assess and control their subjects for many years. Some are more authoritarian 
(like the former projective tests that discover "truths" even "against" the clients), some are 
more collaborative (like the PPR and the SCM). Hermans recognizes in his dialogical 
personal style that PPR is not meant to be the only procedure to study the dialogical self.  
However, probably it is also the time to explore the benefits of biography and 
autobiography. It could be a fantastic challenge: to explore the theoretical field that 
Hermans has created — dialogical self, multivocality, intersubjective change, and so on — 
through narrative-based strategies, like biographies and auto-biographies. 
 
Generative questions 
There is a striking feature in Hermans’ article we have yet mentioned: the clear way 
he shows how the problems we face in psychotherapy can be conceived as oppositions 
between different narrative modes. Conflict and pain are drawn in a developing drama 
where voices fight for a place in people’s lives. Moreover, he also illustrates how 
movement and dialogue between different voices has a potential positive effect. The 
psychotherapeutic work unfortunately is not further detailed, but it seems tremendously 
dialogical and narrative-based. We conclude that even if some features of it are 
troublesome, it has some strongly positive aspects, namely: 
- it may facillitate the development of a range of potential narrative positions; 
- it may feed the development of dialogical processes by encouraging the person to 
tell her/his story from a different position. 
 
These two features have a significant contribution towards a more dynamic and 
dialogical way of doing psychotherapy. Moreover, they raise two different kinds of 
generative questions: the problem of personal organization and complexity of the 
dialogical self, and the problem of improving our ability to help those who ask for help in 
psychotherapy. 
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The first problem is related to several specific questions. For instance, what kind of 
dialogical organization underlies the problems we deal with in psychotherapy? Is the 
person dominated by a specific voice that silences and monologizes others? Or is the 
problem linked to voice dissociation (see Hermans & Gonçalves, 2000)? 
If we learn more about specific types of dialogical organization, we will be able to 
better understand the persons seek for psychotherapy. But we will also need to clarify 
what can be helpful and empowering for that particular person, living in a particular 
situation. Will the person benefit from an effort to give voice to a specific position? Are 
there occasions that require a restriction in the dialogue with one position? Why, how and 
when? 
Different authors (e.g., Elliot & Greenberg, 1997; Hermans, 1997; Honos-Webb & 
Stiles, 1998; Stiles, 1997) have made some interesting contributions to answer these 
questions, in a fascinating dialogue between “old” voices and “new” voices. In this field, 
Valsiner also (2000) has made an extremely promising proposal of classification between 
different developments of dialogical relationships that match Hermans’ theory. And this is 
only one example of many exciting developments we can expect to find in the theoretical 
field of the dialogical self. 
We look forward, with excitement and curiosity, to the new paths these dialogues will 
create.  
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